Hotelling-Downs Model
Question
2. Hotelling-Downs Model with Multiple Parties (30pts)Consider the Hotelling-Downs model with four
parties (A, B, C, and D) contending in the election. All parties are office-seeking and maximize their own probabilities of winning the election. Suppose that the voters’ ideal policies are distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 1]. Answer the questions on the following pages.
(1) Is the action profile where parties A and B choose the policy platform 1/4 and parties C and D choose the policy platform 3/4 a Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. (15pts)
(2) Is the action profile where parties A and B choose the policy platform 1/3 and parties C and D choose the policy platform 2/3 a Nash equilibrium? Explain your answer. (15pts)
*Please explain in detail with logical steps. Will not give the press the accept button without concrete explanation*